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1. Introduction 
This paper is about the presentation and manipulation of the exchange of 
goods and services in Southern Tunisian marriages. It is also an attempt to explain 
the rationality of such presentations by reference to the transmission of property and 
to domestic politics. Most discussions on marriages among the Arabs have noted that 
the size of marriage payments are no necessary reliable guide to the social position of 
the contracting parties (Comaroff, 1980; Peters, 1980) as seems to occur in the 
European Mediterranean, although ethnographies on Tunisia (e.g. Cuisenier, 1976; 
Abu Zahra, 1982) are silent on this point. Tapper (1981) has even suggested that 
direct exchanges and brideprice are 'alternative forms' of marriage, the former 
egalitarian the latter hierarchical. Even where brideprice is exchanged, 'the 
complicated system of gifts and countergifts allows of great variations, so that it is 
extremely difficult for an outsider to know how great are the expenses which a 
bridegroom in any one case really has for his bride when everything is taken into 
account' (Granqvist, 1931:126). 
This paper has three purposes. First, it suggests that concealment, 'complication', 
and a certain presentation of the exchange of goods and services at marriage, far from 
being impediments to analysis, provide critical insights into the rationality of 
Southern Tunisian marriages. They enable a number of statements to be made by the 
contracting parties to each other, and to the public at large. Such statements may not 
be congruent with each other, men (and women) manipulate them for various ends, 
often with ambiguity and conflict. 
The second purpose is to ground such complex exchanges, with strategically 
manipulable definitions, in the transmission and exploitation of property, and in 
domestic politics. In contrast to many transactionalist writings (e.g. Comaroff, 1980; 
Rheubottom, 1980), I do not take the lack of exchange or transmission of goods at 
marriage as necessarily opposed to stratification, nor to theories which give causal 
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importance to modes of property transmission (Goody, 1976), although the 
problematic of property in N. African marriage strategies is often cast elliptically. In 
S. Tunisia complexity in marriage payments, even the occasional overt absence of 
substantial economic transfers, are partly a function of the perception of risk. 
Conservatism and a fear of losing control over material and symbolic resources 
(land, kinsmen, domestic harmony, etc.) influence the manipulation and presentation 
of marriage payments. Such risks vary and are perceived differentially across various 
strata; they also vary within and between the property-holding contracting groups. 
The strategic organization of marriages, their familial and social definitions, are 
therefore of paramount concern in a society where every marriage offers new 
opportunities for realignments of individuals and their access to resources. It is not 
only with whom marriages are arranged which is important, but by whom and how 
they are pursued and presented (through marriage payments) within the family and 
the wider society. 
A final concern is to reintegrate property transmission in the analysis of marriage 
strategies and marriage payments. The standard argument is that men marry close kin 
to 'keep property within the family', yet the reality is that they often divide.1 For 
with and besides land, men inherit a determinate set of social relations which 
constrain or encourage them to certain courses of action. Such relations are as 
important as property in structuring the field of marriages. If men (and women) hold 
property jointly for long periods, as in Southern Tunisia, they are as equally liable to 
quarrel and divide as to arrange marriages between themselves. Hence both inherited 
land and social relations affect the choice of affinal alliances. 
II. Social Organization of El Hamma el Djerid 
El Hamma consists of an oasis cluster of 4 hamlets (Filej, Nemlett, 
M'Hareb and Arik) 9 km from Tozeur and approximately 500 km from Tunis. Its 
total population in 1980 was 7,498 divided (in 1972) into approximately 1200 
households. About 71% of the male labour force zx&fellaha (farmers), though some 
30% of these also work as wage labourers on a nearby nationalised ex-Colonial 
French plantation; 12% are khammesa (sharecroppers) and the remaining 17% follow 
a variety of occupations (merchants, shopkeepers, vegetable stall sellers, bakers, 
etc.) Only some 30% of its total area of 470 hectares of palm trees produce the 
Deglaat ennour date, the main cash crop; the remaining land produces other date 
varieties with limited cash crop potential. Acreage is therefore less important than the 
variety of date and water-rights; and land is far from evenly divided. The hamlet, 
Arik, is mostly inhabited by sharecroppers. 
Dates have been marketed on a large scale since the 1950s; previously they were 
exchanged for wheat and other staples through the Bedouin. A limited amount of 
vegetables are grown for home consumption and some wealthy men possess goats 
and cows whose milk fetches a high price locally. Date cultivation is not labour 
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intensive, nor specialised apart from fertilisation (dhukkar), and mechanisation has 
made few inroads as the hoe (mes 'a is used. Women do not work the fields nor are 
they greatly involved in processing the cash crop (which requires little preparation). 
Though political and economic advantages are attached to large domestic groups, 
there is a less compelling need as in the past to maintain the ambiguous ideal of an 
extended household consisting of a man, his wife and their married sons. Common 
productive activities are limited to fertilisation and harvesting. Economically, long 
exposure to wage labour in the mining industry on which many young men depend 
has weakened the elders' traditional monopoly of land, probably the single most 
important factor weakening the extended domestic community. With the introduction 
of cash the domestic community is united more in the redistribution of income from 
various sources rather than production. Finally, domestic activities such as the 
preparation of food, require less collective effort than in the past, partly due to the 
marketing of new foodstuffs and their storage through refrigeration. 
A small-scale survey of 28 households in one neighbourhood revealed that half of 
all households consisted of nuclear family units. Of the remaining half, 14% 
consisted of single, divorced or widowed individuals with no conjugal ties, whilst 
the remainder (36%) contained a father and 2 or more married sons or an agnatic core 
of 2 co-residing married brothers (11%); the remaining 25% contained the elderly 
mother of the (male) household head. The latter should therefore be considered 
extended households in the last stages of the developmental cycle; it is clear that the 
extended household is a significant form of domestic organization. 
The significance of the extended household is partly due to the social and 
economic dependence of the young upon their elders. Economically, unmarried sons 
are expected to contribute to the family purse; in return the father pays the mahr 
('brideprice'). Some men had flatly refused to arrange their sons' marriages as they 
had not contributed to family funds. Dependence is likely to increase for some years 
after marriage; the building of a house is expensive and liable to last an average of 7 
years. Supplementary income from parents is welcome, and there is always the fear 
of being cut off from the patrimony. As the older generation controls access to the 
womenfolk, marriages are likely to be arranged to increase the dependence of the 
young upon the old. Fission offers ambiguous benefits, and the effects are neither 
short-term nor circumscribed. They affect the pattern of eventual division of 
property, align individuals in certain configurations, and therefore ultimately affect 
successive marriage patterns. Caught within this is a certain presentation of social 
reality influenced by their perceptions of government attempts at 'modernization'. In 
the next section I examine this presentation and the overall general features of 
marriage patterns in El Hamma. 
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III. The Presentation of Marriage 
There are two levels to the presentation of marriage in El Hamma; both 
possess varying degrees of concealment, ambiguity and political subtlety. At the first 
most general level there is the attempt to deny the importance of 'arush (sing. 'arsh: 
patrilineal descent group), or that the exchange of goods at marriage is reflective of 
social stratification. When questioned, men initially attempt to present an ideology of 
open exchange: 'we don't marry within the 'arsh any more; that was the practice of 
our jdud (ancestors)'. Over twenty years of government propaganda against what 
Bourgiba, "le Libérateur de la Femme Tunisienne", called 'outmoded beliefs' such as 
close marriages and habous, maraboutism and hadras (ecstatic seances), have made 
villagers more circumspect in describing themselves, just as most marriage contracts 
indicate 1 Dinar as shart whereas in reality large sums are often transferred. Most 
vocal are the young men who claim to reject close marriages citing the bio-genetic 
reasons advanced in radio programmes; to them such marriages are the symbol of 
their domination by their elders, but most marry those decided for them, a proportion 
of whom are close kin. 
The attempt to define the present as radically different from the past, in effect to cut 
off the past, is more than mere rhetoric. Contained within such statements are a 
number of unresolved contradictions, highlighting the relationship of the villagers to 
the political elite in Tunis, and certain tensions within the village social structure. 
Government exhortations combined with a selective use of koranic precepts (such as 
a low shart) find fertile ground within the village especially among the poor. 
Destourian socialism merges imperceptively into the egalitarian umma not merely in 
free-floating values, but also in (and because of) the overlapping of secular and 
religious power in the village: the present Imam was previously the Rais Chaba 
(Village Party Head); the present Rais was educated at the Zeitouna mosque. When 
men point to some spectacular examples of marriages across class and family 
boundaries to support their claims that between rich and poor there is no distinction 
in marriage, they invariably indicate these men in whose structural interest it is to 
maintain and service such beliefs. The local elite do not need to rely on an overt 
system of stratified marriage to buttress their pre-eminence; indeed such a system 
would cut them off from the legitimation of the umma and the grass roots party 
framework which mutually re-enforce each other. Instead they arrange their 
marriages in certain ways; they can choose the poorest of men, a khammes 
(sharecropper) as an affine accepting 1 Dinar as a symbolic shart (brideprice), yet 
carefully arranging other marriages to balance it, and gathering prestige through 
virtuousness. It is a system which relies on subtlety, selective concealment, and the 
careful balancing out of different and competing claims. 
A competing system of discourse emphasizes local endogamy, referring to a 
foundation myth which links 2 hamlets (Nemlet and Arik) against a third (M'hareb) 
in a conflict over women.2 The story (sometimes referred to by informants to explain 
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why they do not intermarry) highlights the negative consequences when preferential 
marriage to those who claim to have rights, such as a FBS, conflicts with sentiments 
of collective local honour; marriages which cross local boundaries result in 
conflicting loyalties, and active hostility (feud) was transformed into passive non 
exchange of women through a marabout's intervention.^ 
The two systems of discourse, one universal, pietistic and egalitarian, the other 
particularistic and emphasizing parsimony, fix the conceptual boundaries, as it were, 
of social evaluation. Yet although men can draw upon two competing evaluative 
systems to describe their own and other men's actions, it is important to note that 
there is no overall hierarchy of marriages according to the amounts transferred as 
occurs in Southern Europe (Sant Cassia, 1982). In other words social position 
cannot be 'read off the amounts transferred at marriage. This is due to (i) the use of 
brideprice as Peters (1980) has pointed out, as an index of social distance between 
the contracting groups, (ii) that the exchanges are not always undirectional, and (iii) 
because there is often a conscious manipulation and even concealment of the amounts 
transferred. In short, there is a private and public presentation of marriage payments; 
various actors attempt to insist on one presentation in contrast to another. 
IV General Marriage Patterns 
Two main analytical questions arise when discussing marriage patterns in 
El Hamma. First, what is the unit of analysis; second, whom do villagers tend to 
marry? It is generally agreed that the concept of the "family" is of limited analytical 
value in North Africa societies (Peters, 1978; Cuisenier, 1976; Davis, 1977). In her 
discussion on The Meaning of Family Ties', Hildred Geertz observed that '(the) 
assumption that Moroccan society is successively "built up" out of component 
"families" whether these are assumed to be domestic groups or descent groups, can 
lead only to error' (1979:136). In this article I shall be taking the joint land-holding 
group as my unit of analysis; land is the basis of unity, and often of conflict. It is a 
referential point around which and through which villagers maintain the service links 
among themselves. It frees the observer from inflexible definitions and points to 
fluctuating boundaries which can encompass the domestic group, dispersed kinsmen, 
and even affines in certain occasions. As constantly shifting networks and 
concentrations of claims, rights and duties, structure the social field in coalitions 
partly grouped together around access to land, the analysis switches from static 
groups to the changing nature of links between individuals, and how they are 
reproduced across time. 
Table 1 indicates whom villagers tend to marry; half of the men and women tend to 
marry within the 'arsh (patrilineal descent group), of these 12.5% are to the 
bint'amm. The survey upon which these figures are based was conducted in one 
neighbourhood. There is no reason to believe that they are unrepresentative. Apart 
from the somewhat dubious value of confirming the pattern noted by other 
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anthropologists (e.g. Granqvist, 1931), the figures indicate nothing on the reasons 
why villagers chose such spouses. Indeed they show that 'out marriage' requires as 
much explanation, if not more, than the anthropologically cherished practice of FBD 
marriages (50% vs. 12.5%). 
Table 1. Spouses of men in one neighbourhood (in IvThareb) 
KIN 
FBD FZD MBD FBSD FZSD SAME ARSH NON KIN TOTAL 
No. 4 1 1 2 1 7 16 32 
% 12.5 3.125 3.125 6.25 3.125 21.875 50 100 
An additional problem is that the figures refer to men's marriages; women tend to 
marry within the 'arsh to a greater extent, or at least within their natal hamlet. Indeed 
men justify local endogamy, meaning women's marriages, by reference to control of 
land. Women's marriages thus require different interpretation which I shall return to 
below, but it is generally recognized that women often claim their rights to land, and 
marriage to a neighbouring hamlet is a potential invitiation to claim land rights.^ In 
short the preference of men and women is generally towards matrimonial self 
sufficiency mithin the hamlet; failing that there is a preference towards marriages with 
more distant towns rather than with neighbouring hamlets.^ 
Apart from the crucial importance of land, the control and restriction of women's 
marriages is due to political reasons; both men and women believe that marriage 
outside the locality would socially isolate a woman, and increase the possibilities for 
divorce activating claims upon her agnatic kin. 
At this point it is worthwhile to deal with the critical question of the extent to 
which women inherited (or successfully claimed) land in the past. The issue has 
often been raised in anthropological accounts (e.g. Khuri, 1979, etc.), and clearly 
influences marriage patterns. In El Hamma there are many old men who currently 
exploit land inherited from their mothers, although some activated claims which their 
mothers had left dormant. Men do not distinguish between the ganoun orfvya 
(customary law), which Cuisenier (1976) claims disinherited women, and Islamic 
law (though the availability of the makhma — lawcourts — and recent government 
initiatives have undoubtedly facilitated the claiming of rights). Rather, they talk about 
"giving up property rights to others", selmu, (to hand over intact).^ 
Apart from the crucial importance of land, the control and restriction of women's 
marriages is due to political reasons; both men and women believe that marriage 
outside the locality would socially isolate a woman, and increase the possibilities for 
divorce activating claims upon her agnatic kin. 
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Ideed, as I hope to show, the question of whether women inherit property or not 
should be framed differently; it should be approached in terms of who (regardless of 
gender) activates claims to the parental estate from those who have assumed 
management (usually one or a couple of brothers), and who does not, preferring to 
leave their claims dormant until the right time asserts itself. If women wish to claim 
their share of the parental estate their portion is usually given them; many, however, 
chose not to do so, especially in the early years of marriage. Insistence at this stage 
would be tantamount to isolation from kin, clearly against a woman's interests 
especially if marital problems emerge. Hence most women prefer to leave their claims 
on the parental land and house dormant, to be exploited by the dominant brother from 
whom they receive some recompense. This is especially true of the parental home to 
which they can return, from which they cannot be excluded by their brothers' wives. 
In short, for both men and women absolute control of property implies absolute 
control over one's destiny, and hence to have no claims upon others. This is a 
society where men and women transform every social action into a debt which must 
be reciprocated. Independence in the S. European sense (meaning to be free of 
obligations) implies weakness and to be free from the possibility of exerting 
influence on others. Other rights can be claimed against property (e.g. sustenance 
and support in the case of a woman's divorce), but property should not be claimed 
for itself ideally. Indeed women usually claim their shares late through adult sons 
who replace their brothers as resources should marital problems emerge (such as the 
importation of another younger wife). Women who claimed their land at an early 
stage in their marital careers were either married to very distant kin, or to very poor 
men who valued strict short term economic criteria over long term affinal unity. 
Two consequences follow from this. First, because women can make claims 
against men and can subvert the whole structure of cooperation, men (especially 
brothers) attempt to arrange their marriages in certain ways to weaken such 
tendencies; simultaneously, women, especially mothers, attempt to influence or 
change these decisions either to ensure that their own position in the household is not 
threatened (such as through the importation of a HBD) or, for their daughters, to 
guarantee that they have as much leverage over the menfolk as possible (such as 
insisting on a high mahr to make divorce more costly). The upshot of all this is that 
husbands and wives often conflict over the arrangements of their children's 
marriages, but wives have the upper hand for they can severely disrupt domestic 
harmony. 
Given this main distinction between those who work the land in the name of a 
collectivity and those who do not, the major problem becomes: who can gather the 
most powerful coalition behind him against other claims; or put differently, who can 
devise as many strategies as possible to convince the other heirs that it is in their 
interest to allow him to represent them and work the land. Failing that, it is a question 
of how much of the patrimony he can claim. 
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In the next section I examine the use of marriage as a strategy to increase claims 
upon the estate, and even weaken the claims of others. Central to this approach is the 
view that marriages cannot be seen individually in isolation, but in relation to the 
whole system of marriages within the property-holding group. Furthermore, as the 
transfer of goods at marriage is complex, various actors attempt to manipulate their 
private and public presentation in pursuance of their strategies. 
V. The Arrangement of Marriage and Marriage Payments 
Marriage is a collective 'family' decision, although the most powerful 
member of the household (male or female) may decide unilaterally and prevail upon 
the other members to accept it. In the past marriages, especially between uled I'amm, 
were occasionally arranged mil-hofra (lit. 'from the hole i.e. at birth) so named after 
the hole in the comer of the house where the afterbirth was buried, and were a clear 
attempt to control all aspects of fertility. Apart from the desire to circumvent fission 
and cement the ties between brothers who might come to quarrel over their father's 
inheritance when their daughters were of marriageable age, another reason was to 
ensure that the daughter would be promised (mahouba) should she be orphaned. 
In the arrangement of marriages it is useful to distinguish between those who. plan 
and make the initial proposal, from those who bargain and negotiate over the details 
once the proposal has been theoretically accepted; the two groups are not necessarily 
identical. Generally, the former have a clear opportunity to strengthen their position 
within the domestic group. Yet this is somewhat tempered by the negotiating group, 
often larger in number, who attempt to impose their definition of the public 
presentation of the marriage. 
Local marriages, what Bourdieu calls 'ordinary marriages' (1977), are exclusively 
arranged and negotiated by women, including those marriages between uled I'amm. 
Women also often propose marriages outside the village where there is a pre-existing 
affinal or agnatic link however distant, though it is common for men to be drawn into 
the negotiations. Men arrange those marriages outside the village where there is no 
pre-existing affinal or agnatic link between the two households. Often, in the case of 
sons' marriages, men pretend to maintain a studious indifference, and the bargaining 
and handing over of the mahr is conducted by the mother. There are two reasons for 
this. First, relations between a father and adult son are markçd by extreme formality; 
second, men are very aware of the powerful influence of their wives in sanctioning 
marriages. In general, although fathers may propose establishing affinal links, their 
wives may dispose, and the former rarely insist as the risks of fission within the 
extended household would increase. When men intervene (or are appealed to) and 
accept a proposal for a daughter from socially (and/or geographically) distant suitors, 
they leave the 'details' to the women. Such 'details' are far from insignificant; as I 
shall show they may define the marriage publicly in certain ways and may even 
weaken the motives underlying the proposal. Men readily acknowledge the powerful 
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influence of women; one man claimed that he arranged his marriage not to coincide 
with any aits (feasts) when he would have been obliged to send the customary gifts 
to his bride's mother who might have complained about their suitability and value. 
Similarly, refusals of a proposal for a bride differ according to gender. Men never 
refuse a proposal directly; instead a girl's father may attempt a virtuous ploy to 
discourage unwanted village suitors by claiming that "she is promised to her cousin". 
Alternatively he and his wife may insist on a high mahr, beyond the means of the 
family, if they are socially distant. The word used is sehtu (from the root suht — to 
forbid), but whereas most men claim that this is not done for economic motives, but 
for symbolic ones as an indication that they are not keen on the match, women are 
much keener on the public presentation of high marriage payments for symbolic 
purposes. I shall return to the symbolic and economic aspects of marriage payments 
later. 
Due to the virilocal nature of marriage and the transfer of goods from the groom's 
family to the bride's (and back again), the problems faced in marrying daughters and 
sons are different. The marriages of daughters is an individual problem, it is up to the 
household head to decide whether to accept the groom's family as affines and he can 
adjust the mahr accordingly. Men say "il bint timshi" — the daughter leaves (at 
marriage); responsibility for her ceases although she may return in the case of 
divorce. By contrast the marriage of sons is a collective problem for the whole 
household because it is partly up to the father to fork out the mah (and this depends 
on what other men demand for their daughters), and hence involves careful planning. 
An added reason is that 'inequality' (in the wide sense) between the inmarrying 
women (and between them and his wife) can threaten domestic harmony. 
Marriage is marked by three transfers of goods and cash: lotriya, mahr and 
kiswah. The first consists of the transfer of uncooked foodstuffs (a live sheep, 
tomatoes, potatoes, semolina, tea, coffee and sugar) and toiletries from the groom's 
to the bride's household after the signing of the sdaq (marriage contract). This food 
will be consumed by the kin of the bride. Occasionally gifts are sent prior to the 
signing of the sdaq after the two groups have theoretically agreed on the match. They 
are taken as an indication of the groom's intentions especially when the marriage is to 
be celebrated much later. The otriya is a relatively private presentation and it is 
consumed by a small circle of the bride's kin. But once an agreement has been made 
between relations the two domestic groups become more formal, self-conscious, and 
observant. One man who was promised to his MZD commented that prior to the 
verbal agreement (the sdaq had not yet been signed, a clear indication of the 
confidence both parties had in each other, whereas among socially distant parties the 
emphasis is on an immediate closure of the agreement), he often used to visit dar 
khaltu (his MZ's house). "But since I've been mahtoub (promised) I don't visit; it's 
better that way. We will sign the sdaq exactly before the wedding, so that everything 
will be...concentré" (the pun being on tomato paste used for couscous, always 
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referred to by its French name, and the bridal night when the wedding sheets are 
exhibited). More than light-hearted ambiguity was contained in the remark. A girl's 
chances of getting married are much reduced if the 'engagement' is broken off 
especially by her kinsman. It is undesirable to have a long betrothal period. 
Mahr and jewellery are often classed together in discourse because they involve a 
single expenditure by the groom's household, and are bargained over together. Yet 
they are logically distinct in the paths they follow, and in the use made out of them by 
the participants. The mahr is the sum of money formally demanded by the bride's 
father from the groom, though women often conduct the bargaining and fix the 
amount. The cash is then redirected to purchase durables and consumer items such as 
a fridge, gas stove, crockery, etc. for the daughter who has also been accumulating 
the products of her labour since puberty. Men describe the mahr as "her father gives 
her", meaning that he has demanded a certain amount on her behalf, though it is not 
unknown for poor families to retain part of it. Many women claimed that the mahr 
pales into comparison to what they had accumulated and what their parents endowed 
them with. 
In addition gold and other items of jewellery of a specific monetary value are 
demanded by the bride's mother for her daughter. Thus a 'typical' agreement might 
specify the payment of, say, 100 Dinars cash and 200 Dinars' worth of jewellery. 
The latter is a 'gift' of the groom to his bride and her clearest item of security J Yet 
although gold is immediately exchangeable for cash in Tunisia (there is a 
Government pawnshop in Tozeur which conducts a brisk trade), the symbolic 
nuances are clear. Gold and jewellery are items of personal decoration and display, 
stored unproductive wealth, rather than consumable domestic items for the use of the 
conjugal pair, and a clear indication of her value wherever she goes. The gift of gold 
and clothing denotes the appreciation of and passage to a socially recognized 
sexuality, similar to the giving of red roses by men to women in Western Europe.** 
From the standpoint of a groom's household the mahr and gold are discussed and 
evaluated together, and involve a considerable capital outlay. But from the standpoint 
of the bride and her mother, gold and clothing is something more; it is an 
appreciation of personal worth, of affinity and a recognition of their sexuality.9 
The amount demanded from the groom in cash and gold is often an index of the 
social distance between the two family corporations, and it can be highered or 
lowered according to the value placed upon affinity by the bride's corporation. Peters 
is making much the same point when he observes: The seeming differentiation of 
women by bridewealth is not attributable to a single cause, such as status, but to the 
kind of social relationship already in being or desired' (1980:152—3). Villagers 
confirm the symbolic character of mahr when they claim: "if the bride's family want 
the 'oris (groom) they ask for very little". More than mere perceptions of the 
advantages of affinity are contained here, as land is mainly but not exclusively the 
basis of livelihood, and as women can claim land irrespective of the size of their 
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marriage endowments, the operative concept here is perceptions of risk. A 'bad 
marriage' is almost always one which separates the bride from her kin and 
precipitates claims on the estate. 
Apart from the manipulation of the total amount demanded, the degree of 
specificity or ambiguity in the demand for mahr permits both contracting groups to 
elaborate on their conception of social relations. Even when the bride's group is 
desirous of the match they can hardly specifically demand a small amount for that 
would devalue themselves and the bride. If the suitor is a kinsman the demand is left 
vague; small symbolic amounts of cash are demanded, whereas there may be a 
substantial transfer of gold and jewellery which have the nuances cf a 'gift' and of 
estimation. If the suitor is socially distant, especially if he is from a different 'arsh, 
there may be complicity in inflating the amount, to 'justify' the marriage outside 
kinship boundaries, and increase prestige. Thus mahr represents on one level the 
lowest common economic estimation of the social distance between the two family 
corporations. 
So far the types of marriage payments discussed have dealt with the value placed 
on affinal relationships (nasab) by the bride's family, and it has been merely 
expressed negatively i.e. by demanding less. Yet a final marriage transfer, the 
kiswah, a gift of items of clothing, henna and toiletries, bought for the bride by the 
groom, enables the latter and his family corporation to elaborate on their conception 
of social relations. The kiswah procession is the most visible single festivity of the 
whole marriage, attended by hundreds of men and women who follow the groom, 
his friends and musicians, to the bride's house. Women make up the rear, the 
groom's kin (mother, ammt, etc.) carrying valises containing items of clothing. Once 
deposited at the bride's house they are carefully examined by the women who 
comment critically on the amounts, types of clothing and their quality. Many men 
who gave a low mahr claimed to have invested in a big way in the kiswah, as a sort 
of compensation. 
A final set of 'exchanges' which deserves particular mention because it highlights 
the separation of the men's and women's worlds is the ramy (from the root 'to 
throw'); this is the giving of money and other goods to the groom and his bride. The 
principal features of ramy are: (i) that it is given separately by men and women to one 
of the spouses, i.e. it is not given in the name of a collectivity but by individuals; ii) 
the groom and bride receive separately; iii) it is expected that the amounts given be 
returned in exactly their same amount in the future though it is acceptable to return 
gifts at other occasions such as a circumcision, a hizb, a birth, the building of a 
house, or the return from Mecca. The ramy given to the groom is economically 
useful for it is used to establish the new household (though previously it belonged to 
his father); the money given the bride however is not hers, it is given to her 
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mother. A woman starts receiving ramy when she is a mother for she has been giving 
since early puberty. Villagers say: "Kul shey slef — every gift is a loan, and most 
women take their 
obligations seriously as well as having a keen memory for the return gifts due to 
them. Indeed many keep lists together with the amounts due. One typical list which I 
examined was given by the groom to his mother for safekeeping, as he moved to 
another town. He also left some money to be used for restitution should the occasion 
arise. Of note in this list (which was not extensive, there were others) was the 
preponderance of women, equally divided between kin and non-kin. By scrupulous 
adherence to the ideology of strict restitution women maintain large extended 
networks, in some senses far wider than men and separate from them. These 
networks extend further than their natal family and affinal groups and are 
continuously serviced through visiting and major life ceremonies; they enable women 
to exercise a good deal of influence through their knowledge of the domestic affairs 
of far-flung households. 
It thus makes little sense to reduce marriage payments to crude economics, to 
'cost' or 'price', on one hand, although these are clearly important. Nor does it mean 
that stratification does not affect marriage payments, although it is clear that the 
relationship is complex, for we are dealing with three items (cash, clothing, and 
gold) which have different symbolic characteristics and are articulated (and 
manipulated) in certain ways. Status in a hierarchy cannot be 'read off the size of 
marriage payments (and there is one sense in which the wealthy make a virtuous 
display of not demanding large brideprice payments) partly because of the complexity 
of the exchanges which are not unidirectional, partly because of purposeful 
doncealment and manipulation, and finally because public knowledge of such 
exchanges emerges out of rumour and the 'stage management' of the kiswah 
procession. In contrast to Southern Europe men do not boast about setting-up their 
daughters with cash, houses, land, etc. 1 * partly because it is the women who display 
and manipulate these images, and because it conflicts with the religious sense of 
values which places a premium on piety, virtuousness and alliance. 
Such systems permit ambiguity and manipulation. Most observers have noted that 
marriage precipitates various claims and different actors attempt to impose their own 
definition of the affinal alliance by manipulating its private and public presentation. 
Perceptions of risk are critical. One basic distinction is between the husband and the 
wife who insists on a high mahr (mainly in gold) especially if her daughter is leaving 
the neighbourhood or village, for reasons of prestige and leverage within her new 
domestic group, and to render isolation from kin and blad less painful. An added 
reason is to make the costs of divorce higher, for the groom and his family would be 
losing the products of many years' labour.^ in contrast men tend to view the 
payment of an overly high mahr as an abdication of exercising influence over their 
affines who may eventually lay claims upon the estate. It is a perspective which 
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prefers to leave debts diffuse and unspecific, rather than treating marriage as a 
manifestation of status. The next section links these various themes together. It 
shows how men attempt to manipulate marriages for various ends (not exclusively 
for property motives) by appealing to certain values, how these marriages make 
sense only in the total context of all the marriages of the domestic group and how 
various actors (especially the women) attempt to manipulate their public presentation. 
Underlying these strategies and motives lies a concern with the control of resources. 
VI. Domestic Politics 
In Cousin Bette, Balzac observed that 'parents may oppose their children's 
marriages, but children have no way of preventing the follies of parents in their 
second childhood.' In this section I examine the process of scission and fission 
within the domestic community which is mainly occasioned by marriage. The 
transmission and exploitation of resources can hardly be said to follow any general 
fixed 'rules'. Indeed the process of domestic politics determines how sons move out 
of their natal home, their subsequent coalitions of interests, and ultimately their own 
affinal alliances through the marriages of their children. 
The causes of fission (in contrast to scission when a son merely moves out of his 
father's house to set up his own household), can be reduced to three: 
i) the introduction of a new wife for the old man especially when he has adult sons; 
ii) conflicts between adult married brothers; 
iii) the death of the household head and his last spouse. 
Perhaps the clearest example of fission is when the old man decides to remarry when 
his sons are adult; the latter have to subordinate themselves and their wives to another 
woman who will in all probability bear offspring and thus diminish their share in the 
eventual estate. The situation is so explosive that the adult children of an earlier 
marriage are often disinherited, by various legal means, in favour of the latest 
product of the conjugal bed. 
By far the most common cause for fission is the conflict between married brothers 
and between their wives and the old woman. To listen to men describe why brothers 
fight is to listen to a diatribe on the disruption caused by women; in one sense it suits 
them to maintain this view. In the past fathers maintained absolute control by 
ordering their sons to divorce their wives should they prove litiguous. Yet the causes 
are much more complex. Punishment of a sibling's children and the different 
economic levels between brothers drive wedges between the women. In reality the 
power of women often derives from their relationship to the dominant man of the 
domestic corporation, i.e. whether their claims on the dominant man of the 
household is stronger than the claims of other women. Hence the strong objection of 
mothers to FBD marriage which weakens their position with respect to husband and 
son. Men say that if her father is dead a daughter loses some of her spirit when 
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dealing with her husband for she would have to rely on the uncertain relations with 
her brothers who are in turn influenced by their wives. 
The old men attempt to dissipate such tensions by various means; like hirkba, the 
game played in the sand, which is a positional game: favouring one son secretly by 
cash gifts and another by land, marrying 2 sons to 2 sisters (a clear attempt to prevent 
conflict between unrelated women), marrying one son to one of his kinsmen and 
another to his wife's kin, in short as Bourdieu (1977) and Marx (1976) observed 
there are as many reasons for marriages as there are marriages. The marriage of one 
son inlfuences subsequent ones; some reasons are long-term (preventing the break 
up of the estate), others short term (maintenance of domestic harmony in his lifetime) 
and still others are retro-active and backward-looking (such as when part of the estate 
is held jointly with distant kin who might eventually insist on a division). 
The decision to leave the father's house is risky and costly; risky, because it leaves 
the field open to other competitors; costly, as most men do not have the necessary 
cash to build their own house and can take up to 7 years to do so. A man is unlikely 
to retain claims to the parental home once he has left, for whilst both men and women 
may live in at least 3 separate domestic communities across time and houses are 
established by men, it is the women who have the greatest interest in retaining rights 
to their parental homes to return in case of divorce. On the death of the old man there 
is the estate to be settled and responsibilities devolved. If he has left a widow (but 
had children from only one wife) the estate is unlikely to be divided during her 
lifetime; indeed it is in the women's interest (mothers and daughters) not to divide the 
property as they require the men to work the land, and to retain diffuse claims upon 
their brothers (for land and property rights are the basis of unity within the domestic 
community). Women usually find support from the most powerful son (not 
necessarily the eldest) whose interest also lies in his control of the land, farming it 
himself, and giving them and other claimants a proportion of the income. 
Alternatively some brothers may insist on a formal or informal division which may 
be resisted by the elder brothers; the latter attempt to gather the womenfolk on their 
side and press for an informal settlement; re-negotiation to occur at some future 
unspecified date. The longer the mes'ul (the responsible brother) manages to stave 
off division through responsibility for his sisters' and mothers' shares, the greater 
the possibility that the use of this land will stay with him and his sons through the 
non-activation of dormant claims by his sister's children whose shares will be further 
subdivided. It is not uncommon for estates to be held indiviso because an elderly 
grand- or great-grandmother is still alive, or even for rights to be left dormant and 
unclaimed over a number of generations. In such cases with a dispersal of kin, a 
refusal to divide is not necessarily a wish to stay together, as Bourdieu (1977) 
implied, a view which gives more substance to kinship solidarity. For whilst a 
division of property in a single generation is always a symptom of grave domestic 
problems ("idheken gesmu mittharkin" — "if they have divided they have fought"), 
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property may be left undivided over a number of generations because the material 
and symbolic costs may be greater if they threaten old, transmitted arrangements, 
than the accruing advantages of a new allocation and division. 
The decision to divide is dependent upon three related factors: (1) structural factors 
such as the number of siblings, amount of land marriage(s) of deceased father, etc.; 
(2) the evolution of the domestic politics of the corporation; and (3) the marriages of 
the daughters. Within the first factor one must include the ratio of brothers to sisters 
(if there are more brothers then there is usually a division), their occupations 
(whether within or out of the village), the size of the estate and whether it is 
economical to divide (which often means whether one powerful brother can convince 
the others that it is not in their interest to do so), and finally whether the children are 
half siblings or not. For the second factor, domestic politics, one must take into 
account why some ctfie sons have moved out, the history of relations between the 
inmarrying women, and that of the brothers themselves. Finally the marriage of 
daughters influences claims on the estate: whether they married in or outside the 
village (in which case their rights remain dormant), and the economic position of 
their husbands who, if poor and distantly related, are more likely to insist on 
division. In any case if all the brothers decide unanimously to divide they usually do 
so among themselves, and it is up to their sisters to insist on their shares. During this 
time men are pursuing their own strategies to strengthen their claims upon the estate: 
arranging marriages for their Sons, exploiting land in common with other 
competitors, giving out a field to a kinsman to sharecrop, such that claims pile up and 
sorting them out becomes difficult. Hence the desire to keep the patrimony within the 
family, often attributed to the anthropolgically cherished practice of bint'amm 
marriage is seen elliptically from the perspective of the father, but it must also be 
viewed from the perspective of the groom (who has to ask for the wife) who may 
desire to increase his leverage and claims on the estate when it is eventually divided. 
I now want to introduce two examples to highlight the inter-relationship between 
marriages and inheritance. In the first case what is significant is the way marriages 
are arranged across generations in order to keep the estate concentrated in a few 
hands. The second example shows how the process of division itself radically 
determines the choice of marriage partners for successive generations. 
Fig.l indicates some of the significant marriages of the ay la Hajj Salah 
•Ramdani, a family corporation that has maintained its patrimony intact for 
over 40 years through the judicious use of marriages across successive 
generations. Put differently it indicates how a branch of the corporation has 
managed to accumulate successive claims to the estate to manage and work it. 
The management of the estate feU to Hajj Salah (Ego in diagram) in 1943, the 
year of his father's death, and is presently being taken over by his son 
Cheikh Lemin. Hajj Salah has been dealing in dates for over 30 years and 
acting as an agent for his extended kin, an arrangement which benefits all. 
Hajj Salah's father married three times and had children from two 
wives; he was himself the issue of a leviratic marriage. Undoubtedly the fact 
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that Fathma, his widow, survived him for a long time (d. 1975), contributed 
to the maintenance of the patrimony intact. Yet more significant are the 
marriages of his children. His son, Mohammed, was married off to his half 
brother's (Bilgecem's) daughter, to be followed by Hajj Salah (henceforth 
called ego) who married another of his father's brother's daughters, a much 
older woman. By this tactic ego's father prevented a division of land held in 
common with his brothers. After his wife's death, ego married Mluka from 
another wealthy 'arsh. Soon after his brother Mohammed married her sister; 
both women were barranin (outsiders) and as two sisters living in ego's 
father's house this made it easier for them to integrate. At that time both ego 
and his brother worked their father's fields, but as Hajj Salah wanted to 
marry Sabiha, his deceased wife's sister, he built a separate house next to his 
father's with the latter's agreement. Sabiha's marriage was short; relations 
between the wives were far from cordial and Hajj Salah divorced Sabiha soon 
after she bore him a daughter. In any case, with his second wife a sister to his 
brother's wife the costs in domestic harmony were too high. After the death 
of his father in 1943 Hajj Salah took Brahim, his half-brother to live with him 
"to be an ayla wahda (one family)". There were advantages to this 
arrangement. Salah had taken over the management of the estate, Tahar his 
brother had disappeared in a POW camp in Germany, and Brahim was the 
one most likely to insist on a division, having been bom from a different 
mother. By removing him from his deceased father's house he also weakened 
the position of Fathma in the daily affairs of the house, which was then 
occupied by Mohammed. Hajj Salah then arranged Brahim's marriage to a 
Tozeur woman, which further weakened his leverage on the family estate. 
However both ego and Mohammed paid Brahim's mahr, a clear indication of 
a corporate mentality. When Tahar returned from the war he married his 
FBD, a sister of Mohammed's first wife. The logic of the last two brothers' 
marriages are different; from the perspective of the dominant coalition of 
interests (the sibs from the first marriage) Brahim's marriage was 'forward 
looking' in that it weakened his political position in any eventual division of 
the property, Tahar's marriage was an attempt to retard the division of land 
originally held by their father and Bilgecem which would have directly 
affected the area they exploited. 
In any case the three brothers (ego, Tahar and Brahim) were working 
the family land together, Hajj Salah was successfully marketing the dates, as 
well of a wide circle of kin, and any demand to divide would have obliged 
people to look elsewhere for marketing arrangements. 
The logic of arranging marriages for widely divergent purposes, yet 
with a common aim in mind, emerges also in the successive generation's 
marriages. Take the children of ego. Algiya, his Z had died in 1965 and her 
son, Selim, was working in Gafsa. From Hajj Salah's perspective the young 
man could insist on his mother's share. The latter chose instead to ask for 
Zohra, ego's eldest daughter, in marriage. Her father did not demand any 
mahr except the traditional 1 Dinar and the couple now reside in Gafsa, 
Algiya's share still being managed by Hajj Salah and his son Lemin. The 
other male heir to Algiya's property, Mahloof, is married to Tiber, Tahar's 
daughter. Algiya's two daughters do not live in Hamma and are unlikely to 
insist on their shares, preferring to,leave them dormant should they return. 
Hajj Salah claims that he accepted a khammes from Tozeur for his 
daughter, Chegra, because she had a different mother and he was aware that 
problems among his children were more likely to emerge. Like Brahim, her 
father's brother, she is the only one to be married outside the dense network 
of inmarriages; both have little power in the domestic corporation. Some men 
claim that she was married off to an outsider because she was very ugly and 
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nobody in the village wanted her. In any case a khammes from Tozeur has 
little possibility of working the land himself. 
For the marriages of his final two children, Hajj Salah chose to 
capitalise on his affinal links, an attempt to ensure domestic harmony between 
his wife and the inmarrying women. Lemin, the Omda or Cheikh, a powerful 
man with even wider marketing contacts, is married to his mother's brother's 
daughter; Zehwa was originally asked for by Mohammed's son, her wild 
arm, who was refused as he was a drunkard. He then gave her to his wife's 
brother's son. Few marriage payments were made in these cases. Lemin's 
mahr was low, "however we spent a lot on the lotriya and the kiswah. I 
didn't ask for anything for Zehwa either, in fact I gave her some gold. I 
didn't give to barranin and I didn't ask for a high mahr. Blood money and a 
high mahr have no merit" (id-diya we is-sart is subiya mhush behyin). 
This statement by a wealthy, powerful and respected elder is significant. Throughout 
the Mediterranean brideprice and blood money are classed together (e.g. in Albania, 
Hasluck, 1954; Palestine, Granqvist, 1931); the association is always negative. Both 
exchanges have common features: they involve payment for the loss of a member of 
another group, they require the use of intermediaries (the wasta) and hard bargaining, 
and they establish barriers between groups. Feuding and intermarriage cannot coexist 
(Black Michaud, 1975), although the latter can be utilised to end a state of hostilities 
(Jamous, 1981). Conversely, just as blood-money does not necessarily end 
hostilities, brideprice (especially when set high) is tantamount to a denial of the 
symbolic value of affinity. Men (and women) may therefore attempt to insist on a 
high brideprice when they wish to deny or negate claims of pre-existing kinship or 
affinity. 
The nature of local power bases affects marriage settlements and the general 
marriage patterns. Where there is a discrete group of Learned Families or a land 
holding elite, as in Peters' (1982) Lebanese village, the ruling group may resort to 
one or more of the following strategies to maintain their position. They may either (i) 
demand a high brideprice to ensure parity, or (ii) disinherit women unilaterally, or 
(iii) endow them with property rights but marry them within the group (as in Abu 
Zahra's Sidi Ameur, 1982). In El Hamma there are no saintly families, nor is land 
the preserve of any one group. There are certainly differences in wealth and land, 
however, wealth can also be partly acquired and maintained through mercantile 
activities, as in Hajj Salah's case. Hajj Salah relies on co-villagers to sell him dates in 
face of stiff competition from Sahil and Sfaxian merchants. There are few overt 
apparatuses to enforce his position, no pre-existing credit relations or henchmen, 
except the social relations he can manipulate, including the marriages of his domestic 
group. He had managed to do so by maintaining the core of the productive group 
intact through a number of inmarriages yet capitalised on affinal links with other 
'arush to increase claims in successive generations. 
The final example draws together a number of themes. It indicates that marriages 
make sense when approached as part of an overall whole which comprises several 
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generations. It shows that inherited social relations are as important as property in 
influencing subsequent marriage patterns, and that the two mutually influence each 
other. Finally, various actors attempt to manipulate the setting and presentation of 
brideprice by advancing conflicting estimations of kinship distance. 
Problems soon emerge among the children of Mohammed b. Amor Cherigi 
after his death (Fig.2) in 1966. Ali, the youngest, who was a main 
protagonist had this to say: "My father was very strict with all of us and his 
wife; he did not allow her to talk at all in his presence. During the day she 
was always at home, she only went to the baths at night and he kept a close 
watch on her. We would stop eating whenever he entered the room and never 
look directly at him. He ordered Boubakr to divorce his first wife, too, 
(MZD) after 2 years' marriage, because he did not get on well with her, she 
spoke too much and didn't seem to respect her husband. We didn't see much 
of them afterwards. We have the following saying. A young boy asked his 
father: "what is my mother's brother to me?" His father replied: "my son, 
were I to divorce your mother, neither would he know us, nor would we 
know him". Of course it is different today, people don't divorce that easily 
with the makhma. I returned from Tunis with my wife. I couldn't tell her we 
were coming to stay in Hamma; otherwise she wouldn't have come because 
she was used to Tunis, so I told her we were just going to visit When I came 
back, apart from my father and his wife Rkeya, Heshmi and Boubakr were 
living there with their wives. Amor, my other brother, had just moved out. 
The house belonged to my father's father (Ammor b. Ibrahim). I lived there 
until 9 months after my father's death. At first things went well; my father 
welcomed me, he gave me some furniture, and I lived there for free. But after 
he died things got bad. Then, when we decided to divide the sheep and goats, 
Rkeya claimed my share. I never saw any of the money my father had saved 
for his trip to Mecca too. Rkeya didn't like my wife and prevented her from 
using the kitchen which had been built by Amor before he moved out. So I 
decided to leave after Amor took me to court and he bribed the court clerk to 
write the wrong date on my summons. I can forget everything, that he robbed 
me for example, but not the hakem; I'll always remember that. Previously 
Amor and I did not speak for 3 years, and we divided the property in 1969, 
(the fields but not the house; as they did not agree they had to ask his FFZS 
to divide). Then, when his son died we made it up. I was in Tozeur at the 
Hospital; Amor was at home. I noticed that the people there were not from the 
'arsh, so I bathed and prepared the body and brought him to Hamma. At the 
burial I buried him myself, spreading the sand and fixing the palms. 
However I did not take Amor by the hand, we weren't speaking and I had 
done my duty. That evening Amor sent his son over to invite me to eat with 
him. I wasn't very eager to go but my wife convinced me and we made 
things up, but I shall never forget about the Hakouma. Habib, my eldest, 
doesn't go to the jemaa to pray under him; he goes to other mosques. Amor 
asked me about this and I said I did not know the reason. But perhaps why 
he doesn't go is because he remembers what Amor did to me in the past." 
Ali's discourse contains a number of themes: the conflict over house and 
fields, his weak political position in the household, and the transmission of 
bitterness over time. The large field which his father had owned with his 
brothers was divided into 5 parts between his father (whose share was 
inherited by Amor), Salah (which went to Amor's wife), Tahar (bought 
subsequently by Salah, Mbarka's son, and then by Amor), Salah, Mbarka's 
son (who sold it to Amor) and Brahim. Amor therefore concentrated four 
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fifths of the land held indiviso by his father and father's brothers. He is the 
most powerful member of the family corporation, having studied at the 
Zeituna, become Rais Chaba (village party cell President), maitre at the 
village primary school, and finally Imam. His FZS, Chehla and Turkiya, turn 
to him for advice and he has the support of the greatest number of siblings as 
well as of his mother. By contrast Ali and Heshmu usually have to accept 
what the dominant coalition of interests imposes. 
The conflict has a sequel. When Nazek, Amor's daughter, had reached 
marriageable age, Amor's wife let it be known discreetly to Hesna (Ali's 
wife) that were Habib, Ali's eldest, to ask for Nazek in marriage they would 
not refuse. The young man was a University student and a good match, but 
Ali seemed disinclined and the matter dropped. Amor's discreet feeler may 
have been prompted by a desire to heal the breach, but he also preferred a 
policy of isolation refusing many proposals from villagers, and eventually 
accepted his mother's brothers' son from a nearby town. For his son Raoufik 
his wife arranged a marriage with Brahim's daughter, (Raoufik's MMBD), 
kinsmen whom they had never had contact with, and who lived in another 
town. The bride's mother initially refused the proposal saying 'we don't give 
to barranin', (the word could have referred to non-kin or non-villagers). 
Raoufik's mother replied: "we are from the same family". The bride (who 
had been appraised beforehand by Raoufik's sister) interjected and said 'leave 
it up to my father.' When he was told he assented, adding that they should 
discuss and hand over the brideprice quickly. A week later Raoufik's M and 
his FM met the bride's F, M, and Z; the bride was not present. Initially the 
bride's M asked for 1000 D. mahr a substantial sum, which was reduced to 
600 D; her family will use part of this to purchase the gold. Raoufik 
interpreted the high demand as an indication that his mother-in-law was not 
very keen on the match. Ten days later Raoufik's M, his FFZ, and his FM 
handed over 300 D; the rest will be paid on the signing of the aqd. Ali learnt 
about the arrangements through others and got offended; soon after the two 
brothers quarrelled over an old house still held jointly. 
Conclusion 
This paper has examined the implications of the transmission of property 
upon the arrangement of marriages in a S. Tunisian village. The overt concern with 
domestic politics, the careful balancing out of various claims across successive 
generations, and the strategic use of brideprice, is perhaps particular to those systems 
where elites are fragmented, have no exclusive monopoly over the means of 
production and rely on various bases of power. When elites rely on ownership of 
land one would expect to find more overt systems of boundary maintaining 
mechanisms, as in certain Lebanese villages (Peters, 1972, Gilsenan, 1977), such as 
different property transmission practices, exclusive marriage arrangements, and even 
differences in dress and deportment. 
This article also raised some general questions about the maintenance of social 
order in a society which possesses a self:conscious ideology of debt, of giving and 
of restitution. Cash and items of monetary value are manipulated in two quite distinct 
ways: to maintain and service debt relations linking individuals and groups in certain 
ways, and also as a measurement of social distance. On a more specific level it was 
suggested that marriage payments in S. Tunisian society possess a symbolism which 
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must be explored quite apart from their economic component. Yet the pursuance of 
marriage, and the presentation of marriage in public, are clearly influenced by the 
transmission of resources. And with land men inherit a determinate set of social 
relations which constrain or encourage specific marriage arrangements. Although 
men may marry close kin if they can do so because they carry property, they may 
also often conflict over rights to that property and in some cases no marriage can 
bridge the gap. Rather than starting with the premise 'men will marry close kin if 
they carry property jointly', it is important to start with the question: "What are the 
implications if land is held jointly between kin?' One implication is that they are as 
equally liable to quarrel and divide as to arrange marriages between themselves. 
Within this schema the significance of Tunisian marriages emerges when taken 
across a number of generations as one attempt among many, made by a wide variety 
of actors, male and female, brothers and sisters, husbands and wives, elder brothers 
and younger siblings, agnates and affines, to strengthen their various and sometimes 
conflicting claims on the patrimony. The manipulation and presentation of marriage 
payments is one further strategy and source of conflict. The categories change over 
time, coalitions evolve and claims pile up on claims, to be balanced by counterclaims 
in the dynamic context of domestic politics. 
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Notes 
'After E. Said's (1978) analysis of the presentation and manufacture of the 
Orient in European literature, hints of 'orientalism' may be read in many 
accounts of marriage among the Arabs. For example so pervasive and 
sustained has been the debate on bint'amm marriage and other close unions, 
that it is important to critically examine their first principles. If close unions 
among North Africans are not forbidden, why should they require particular 
explanation? In Christian Europe such unions are problematical because they 
are forbidden by the Church and popular sentiment. Yet what may demand 
comment in North Africa is precisely the opposite, viz. why do people marry 
non-kin? As there is no rule dividing those who are permitted or prohibited 
spouses (except to a very narrow degree), why is there an almost unhealthy 
preoccupation with those marriages which are prohibited by other cultural 
systems? Explanations are similarly unsatisfactory. Cuisenier's distinction 
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between 'customary' and 'koranic' law (1976) could have evaluative 
implications, quite apart from the dubious status of 'customary' law. Statistical 
analysis of preferential marriages to the bint'amm also fail to explain other 
types of marriages. Even explanations which rely on the property motive, a 
universal concern among agriculturalists, are perceived through European 
lenses, (e.g. 'to keep property within the family') rendering North Africans 
more like feudal Barons intent on keeping the estate intact by casting out heirs. 
It is not so much that property is not important in explaining marriage, it is 
rather that the problematic is cast elliptically. 
^The myth tells of a woman whose father was an M'harbi and whose 
(divorced mother was from Arik. The latter refused to give her daughter to her 
wild 'amm (FBS) from M'hareb and promised her instead to a family from 
Nemlet. On the leylet id-dokhta (wedding night) she was captured by her wild 
'amm. The resulting feud betwen Nemletin and Arkiin on the one hand, and 
MTiarbin on the other was only suspended through a marabout's intervention. 
3M'hareb is the only hamlet to be surrounded by a 'cordon sanitaire' of saints' 
tombs. 
■^Perceptions of relative status nuance the little exchange that occurs. Nemlet, 
the wealthiest hamlet, claims that "(the) M'harbin take (our women) but we 
don't ask (for theirs)". As Mauss observed: "to give is to show one's 
superiority, to show that one is something more and higher...to accept without 
returning or repayiang more is to face subordination, to become a client and 
subservient" (1954:72). The poorest hamlet, Arik, by contrast, tries to present 
an ideology of exchange, but as khammesa they are shunned by other 
localities. 
^This has the effect of limiting the possibilities of a demand for a division and 
concentrating the land in the hands of those who remain within the village. For 
reasons I shall outline below it is often in women's interests to maintain such 
links with their kin. 
6l am excluding habous (public, mixed, or private) which often excluded 
women from inheritance rights. Figures for the total amount of habous in 
Tunisia vary from 33% (Abu Nasr, 1971) to 40% (Brown, 1964:15) in the 
pre-protectorate period. Various legal reforms dissipated public habous\ thus 
by 1956 the area in public habous had declined from hundreds of thousands of 
hectares to less than 20,000 hectares. There seems to have been little public 
habous in El Hamma. In 1931 the Cheikh wrote to the Director of the Habous 
administration on behalf of certain merchants whose stores in the souk had 
been encumbered with rent for Habous purposes, requesting that they be re 
registered as enzel. The properties were small and the Director noted that the 
incomes had not been sent to Tunis as was due. Other properties were rented 
or sharecropped and the mokaddem (the man responsible) received 10% of the 
total income. There is greater information on private and maraboutic habous. 
The former consisted of land which wealthy individuals registered as a family 
foundation, was unalienable in perpetuity and the income distributed among 
the heirs. The total amount of private habous was approximately 38 hectares 
and maraboutic habous about 73, making a total of 111 hectares, 
approximately one fifth of all land. Private and maraboutic habous had 
different administrative regimes. The former was administered by one of the 
heirs of the habous founder, usually the most respected and powerful member, 
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and often exploited by the heirs themselves. In reality the fields were divided 
into smaller parcels corresponding to the number of dyar (households), but 
rotated to ensure equality over a certain time period, and to prevent the 
emergence of permanent claims. Maraboutic or mixed habous was land 
donated to a wali or saint as a result of favours bestowed. Approximately 70 
hectares had been bequeathed by different 'arush. These lands were rented or 
sharecropped on 2-year contracts, but there is less information on their 
administration. It appears that as there were no saintly families in Hamma, the 
land was mainly exploited by descendants of the original bequeather. From the 
accounts of old men it appears that as more recent settlers to the village could 
not claim land there, they entered into some form of clientage to powerful 
'arush, working their land and creating new fields (senia) on the murgharsa 
contract. This was a form of Islamic and Ottoman land tenure which gave men 
who grafted wild fruit trees or created new fields rights to their ownership. 
After the palm trees began to bear dates a proportion of the field would be 
given to the sharecropper. Some men from these client 'arush married their 
patrons and their descendants adopted their patronymic. In some cases the 
original land-holding 'arush donated the newly-created land to a wali to escape 
taxation. However as most saints left no heirs they could claim most of the 
income apart from the expenses involved in maintaining the tomb. El Hamma 
thus differs from Sidi Ameur in the Sahil where most habous was owned by 
the descendants of the saint (Abu Zahra, 1982). Men who demonstrated 
descent from the saint could claim rights, and women who married out of the 
'arush could not transmit these rights. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
genealogies in Hamma are shallow (only 5 generations deep) but wide in the 
present, whereas Sidi Ameur genealogies are deep and narrow. Villagers are 
explicit in stating that "rich aylàt (families) had habous if they had many 
daughters so that the land would not leave the ayla" (mayohrog), and also that 
it was designed to prevent wayward sons from frittering away their 
inheritance. The general feature was the disinheritance of women for rights 
were transmitted exclusively down the male line. Women had rights to khobz 
(i.e. sustenance) but not to the income (flus), and could not transmit these 
rights unless married to a man who held rights to that habous. Habous also 
covered marriage expenses and the armelatun, i.e. support when widowed, yet 
these rights lapsed at marriage. The position of divorced women varied 
according to the provisions of the original testator. In most 'arush divorced 
women could not claim sustenance from the estate. Habous was dissolved in 
1957. It is clear from Cuisenier's examples (1976) that far from being an 
autonomous customary decision to disinherit women by virtue of the ganoun 
orfiyya, many women did not inherit precisely because land had been made 
habous. Although the effect is the same the reasons why women did not inherit 
were different and somewhat predetermined by the practices of previous 
generations. 
7 It also .suffers less from depreciation and is easily 'transportable' in the case 
of divorce or separation. 1 Dinar was approximately equivalent to £1 in 1983. 
8l owe this observation to Professor Goody's interest in "the culture of 
flowers'. A woman's jewellery is likely to grow if the marriage prospers; 
many men buy gold bracelets etc. as gifts for their wives when they visit 
Tunis. 
^Mundy (1981) has noted that Yemeni women exercise all their ingenuity in 
displaying what (Tunisian) men would consider 'baubles'. 
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lOperceptions of risk vary according to the overall general hierarchical position 
of the domestic groups concerned. Thus wealthy 'families' almost always 
draw up wills (waiyya). Large transfers seem to have been a problem in 
Tunisois society for some time. A Beylical decree of 1941 attempted to limit 
the amount paid as mahr and the trousseau (sawar). Paradoxically this was 
well received by both the Zaytuna clergy and progressives. The then chief 
Imam welcomed it as an attempt to resolve the problem of the decrease of 
marriages and births; he noted that fathers ruined themselves to increase the 
value of the trousseau, and complained that the Islamic 'dot' (i.e. mahr) had 
lost its 'moral value' because the mahr which the groom is obliged to give his 
bride was one of the manifestations of men's mission to care for women. If it 
is the woman who supplies the groom with all he requires, he complained, the 
divine word changes its meaning, for it is the women who support men, a 
situation contrary to the nature of civilisation and the moral order". (Quoted in 
Borrmans, 1977). 
1 *1 am thinking here of Italy (Davis, 1973) and Cyprus (Loizos, 1975). 
12in contrast to Peters' Cyrenaican Bedouin the mahr is transferred totally at 
marriage. In the Bedouin semi-pastoral context this system appears to have an 
added function, quite apart from giving the bride and her kin leverage over the 
groom. It disperses a man's resources through debts in various corporations, 
thus minimizing the risk of total loss of the flock. 
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